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THE INTERSECTION OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
COMPETITION: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
MITSUO MATSUSHITA*

I.

A.

WHAT IS INDUSTRIAL POLICY?

Definition of Industrial Policy

Even in a market economy in which the market mechanism operates and government intervention should be kept minimal, there is
need for supplemental measures to deal with market imperfections.
Such market imperfections are sometimes called "market failures"
and include monopolies, externalities, the weak position of small enterprises, trade frictions, the existence of structurally depressed industries, and some other circumstances which necessitate some degree of
government assistance and intervention.
The governments of free-market-economy countries have introduced various measures to assist some sectors of industry, to regulate
conduct of enterprises in other sectors, and sometimes to engage in
business through activities of government corporations. In this sense,
every existing free-market economy is a mixture of the market mechanism and some kinds of governmental involvement. Each country differs from others in the extent to which its government is involved in
steering the economy. The relative role of the government in assisting
and regulating private enterprise is determined by the nation's historical background, its basic political and philosophical orientation, the
stage of economic development, the comparative advantages and disadvantages of industries in the country, and many other factors.
Among advanced industrial countries, Japan is a country in which
the role of government in controlling the market is greater than that
in the United States and some other Western countries. The relatively
high degree of governmental involvement in the economy can be attributed to several factors. Japan was a relatively late comer to the
group of industrialized countries, and the philosophy of "laissez-faire"
was not historically strong. The government/business relationship is
* Professor of Law at Seikei University, Tokyo, Japan, and member of the World Trade
Organization Appellate Body.
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more cooperative than adversarial as compared with, for example,
that in the United States.
Although the term "industrial policy" appears in newspapers,
journals, and academic writings, it has never been officially defined.
Krugman and Obstfeld define it as "an attempt by a government to
shift the allocation of resources to promote economic growth." 1
Buigues and Sapir state that it is "the set of measures applied by governments to deal with the process of structural adjustment associated
with changes in comparative advantage."' 2 This definition includes
measures aimed at declining sectors as well as policies oriented towards the future. A book on industrial policy published in Japan, entitled The Industrial Policies of Japan (Nihon no Sangy5 Seisaku),
defines industrial policies as "those policies designed to cope with the
market failure in the allocation of resources ' 3 and includes measures
to deal with externalities, anticompetitive structures and conducts,
promotion of economy of scale, infant industries, basic research and
development ("R&D"), and elimination of uncertainty in industrial
development.
An elaborate definition of industrial policy is probably not necessary. A tentative and yet workable definition of industrial policy
should suffice. In light of this, we may state that the industrial policy
is a governmental policy to supplement the market in the face of market failure and facilitate its performance in the long run and that it is a
set of measures to deal with specific sectors of the economy. This
statement roughly corresponds to a definition of industrial policy
given by another economist which suggests that industrial policy is
the totality of governmental policies undertaken to change the allocation of resources among industries from what it would be otherwise, or to intervene in the industrial organization within a certain
individual industry, with an intention to enhance the country's economic welfare if and when unrestricted functioning of the competi4
tive market mechanism is found to fail in achieving to that end.
In this respect, industrial policy is distinguished from governmental
measures such as fiscal and monetary policy which may be characterized as "global steering." When exercised properly, therefore, indus1. PAUL KRUGMAN & M. OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY
281 (1991).
2. Pierre Buigues & Andre Sapir, Community IndustrialPolicies, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A NECESSARY RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION? 21
(Pehndon Nicholaides ed., 1995).
3. RYUTARO KOMIYA ET AL., NIHON NO SANGYO SEISAKU 40 (Industrial Policy in Japan)

(1984).
4. Id.
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trial policy does not go against the market mechanism but
supplements its imperfections and facilitates its operations.
B. A Brief History of Japanese Industrial Policy
Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese government has
been actively engaged in promoting industry. For the purpose of our
study, however, it suffices if we confine our observation to the period
after World War II. The period of several years after the end of the
World War II was a period during which the Japanese economic structure was fundamentally reformed. The Occupation Forces brought
into Japan the Economic Democratization Policy which consisted of:
(1) agrarian land reform; (2) labor reform; and (3) deconcentration of
zaibatsu (the large industrial combines which had controlled major
parts of the Japanese economy). Also, the Antimonopoly Law (the
"AML") was enacted in 1947, and this law was designed to be the
basic framework for Japanese industry. Through the 1940s and 1950s,
industrial policy exercised by Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") was the dominant force in the economy.
In an early stage of industrial policy, measures taken by the government were interventionistic as exemplified by "the priority production system" (1946-1948) in which resources such as funds, foreign
exchanges, and imported raw materials were allocated to chosen industries, that is, the coal and steel industries. Since the mid-1950s,
however, the emphasis of industrial policy gradually shifted from a
direct intervention to measures that provide incentive and information to industries, such as giving tax exemptions and subsidies.
From 1950 to the mid-1960s, heavy industries such as steel,
automobiles, aluminum, and petrochemical industries were the main
objects of industrial promotion; the primary objective of industrial
policy at that time was to build up the international competitiveness of
Japanese industries. For this purpose, various incentives such as tax
exemptions and subsidies in the form of preferential financing by organizations such as the Japan Development Bank were provided for
targeted industries. MITI also encouraged merger of large companies.
For example, three Mitsubishi industrial companies were merged into
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1963, and Yawata Steel Company and
Fuji Steel Company merged into Japan Steel Corporation in 1969.
Since about the late 1960s, however, there have been changes in
economic conditions that have necessitated a shift of emphasis of industrial policy. Partly because of a heavy emphasis on the growth of
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-the economy in the 1950s and 1960s,.environmental problems became
serious. Around 1960, an increase of consumer prices became an
acute problem and, in the early 1970s, the oil crisis hit the Japanese
economy. Also, the heyday of the traditional heavy industries passed
and high-technology-intensive industries such as computers and semiconductors became important. Faced with these new developments,
the role of industrial policy, especially that exercised by MITI, began
to change. There was a new emphasis on promotion of high-technology, service, and knowledge industries and an acknowledgment of a
vital need for environmental protection and consumer protection. It
is to be noted that this change is only a change in emphasis. Traditional policy regarding conventional industries has continued. It may
be more accurate to state that industrial policy by MITI has become
more diversified than before. This new trend still continues today. In
addition to the above, since the oil crisis, the enforcement of the AML
has been revitalized and the oil cartel decisions 5 by the Fair Trade
Commission of Japan ("FTCJ") and the courts established the rule
that easy utilization of cartels as tools for industrial policy would be
subject to antitrust scrutinies. Therefore, MITI has come face-to-face
with the fact that it must take into consideration the impact of the
AML when enforcing industrial policy measures and must avoid using
"cartels" as tools for implementing industrial policy goals. This requirement has become even more real as a result of the Strategic Impediments Initiative ("SII") between the U.S. government and the
Japanese government 6 in which the Japanese government promised
that it would strengthen the enforcement of the AML and refrain
from an excessive use of administrative guidance in implementing
governmental policies. Also, more recently, deregulation of the governmental control of business activities has become increasingly important, and this makes it necessary to define the permissible scope of
industrial policy even more narrowly.
As stated above, industrial policy should be regarded as a set of
governmental measures designed to supplement the operation of market mechanism. It follows from this that when the government executes industrial policy, certain conditions must be met. First, measures
taken under an industrial policy program should be limited in time.
Measures taken by the government to carry out industrial policy often
involve assistance to industries. For example, when the government
5. See 38 KEISHO 1287 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 24, 1984).
6. On the SII, see Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example
of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436 (1991).
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provides financial assistance to an industry which is suffering from the
loss of comparative advantage, such assistance should be limited in
time and scope. Second, measures to be taken to implement industrial
policy should be carried out according to a well-established time
schedule, including a plan to phase out the measures. Third, in implementing industrial policy, the government should try to utilize private
initiative as much as possible. For example, as long as it is practicable,
a consortium of private enterprises may be formed to implement the
policy rather than a direct intervention of the government.
C.

The Effectiveness of IndustrialPolicy in Japan

Industrial policy involves governmental activities in business,
whether promotional or regulatory. A close relationship between
government and business is necessary for such a policy to be effectively implemented. It is said that industrial policy in Japan is effectively implemented as compared with other countries. Although it is
hard to make a general statement that industrial policy in Japan is
effectively implemented or vice versa, it is probably true that, at least
in some industrial sectors, MITI's industrial policy in Japan has been
effectively enforced. There are at least two reasons to explain why
MITI's policy has been implemented. First, there has been an historically close relationship between the government and business community. Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the government has been
quite active in promoting and helping industry build international
competitiveness. Through this historical process, a close cooperative
relationship has developed and industries have acquired the habit of
working closely with the government under the leadership of the government. It is to be noted that administrative guidance has been an
important tool in helping the government carry out industrial policy,
and the effectiveness of administrative guidance depends on the close
cooperative relationship between the government and business, as
touched upon above.
Industrial policy exercised by MITI has been successful when its
role is to provide incentive to industries which have some growth potential, such as the computer and semiconductor industries. On the
other hand, industrial policies have failed when government tried to
assist an industry which had little potential for growth.
Viewed as a whole, the post-war success of Japanese industry
should be attributed primarily to the entrepreneurship of industries
rather than the industrial policies of the government. Industrial poli-
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cies, however, have played a significant, though supplemental, role in
the industrial growth of the country by providing incentives to
industries.
The scope of industrial policies is wide and includes the policies
for promoting basic R&D; assisting depressed industries to recover or
find exit; promoting small enterprises; controlling price and production, such as in agriculture; dealing with trade issues with trading partners; and many others. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to
analyze all of the aspects of industrial policies. In the following pages,
we discuss two important aspects of industrial policies and analyze
legal and economic developments. One is joint R&D and the other is
structurally-depressed industry. One important viewpoint of this analysis is the relationship between such policies and competition policies.
II.
A.

JOINT

R&D

Types of R&D

Although Japan is known as a country of high technology, R&D
in Japan has been focused mainly on development research. R&D can
be divided into three categories: (1) basic research; (2) development
research; and (3) applied research. In basic research, there is no immediate link between the research and the development of a particular product. Research is conducted only for the purpose of proving a
hypotheses. In development research, the direct objective is to embody a technology in the form of a product. Applied research is the
intermediary stage between the two.
In Japan, R&D is primarily carried out by private enterprises, and
a natural result is that the emphasis is placed on development research
which leads to a particular product and profit. On the other hand, the
public sector for R&D, such as public research institutions and universities, suffers from the lack of funds and is relatively inefficient. According to a report published by the government, 7 more than seventy
percent of the total amount of money invested in R&D is provided by
private enterprises. Since basic R&D involves large amounts of
money and high risk, private enterprises are unlikely to engage in such
research unless incentives are given. Because developmental research, which produces products, is ultimately derived from basic research, ignoring basic research will eventually weaken the basis of
technology. There has been growing awareness of this possibility and,
7.

See TSOSHO SANGYOSHO SANGYO SEISAKUKYOKU-KOGYO GIJuTSuIN 7 (1985).
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as a result, some measures for promoting basic R&D have been
provided.
B. Research Associations
One such measure is the enactment of the Research Association
Law 8 which provides for the establishment of a research association.
Basic research involves huge amounts of money and is difficult for a
single enterprise to undertake; but if several enterprises pool their
money and resources, something can be accomplished. Under this
law, private enterprises can form an association for the purpose of
carrying out a specific technological task. An association created
under this law can apply for a patent on the technology resulting from
the joint research. Along with this system of combining resources, tax
exemptions of various kinds and governmental subsidies are provided.
Private enterprises can engage in joint R&D in the form of a cooperative or joint venture. For example, private enterprises can form
a cooperative under the Civil Code; each member contributes technology and funds, dispatches research personnel, and jointly engages in
R&D of a product. Technology which results from the activities is
jointly owned by members and utilized by them. Private enterprises
can also form a joint venture company which engages in R&D in a
technological area. The joint venture company owns the resulting
technology, and patents on the technology are licensed to parent
companies.
However, a research association under the Research Association
Law has advantages over the above forms of cooperation among enterprises. First, a research association can apply for a patent and own
it when granted. Then, the patent can be utilized by any member enterprise. Second, tax exemptions and other incentives are provided if
private enterprises engage in R&D in the form of research association. Third, often government aids, such as subsidy or commission of
a project, are available if private enterprises engage in R&D in the
form of research association under the Research Association Law.
The government sometimes gives a subsidy to a research association to carry out a project in the form of a monetary grant and the
participation of government scientists and engineers. Also, the government sometimes commissions a research association to carry out
research for the government. In such areas as integrated circuits and
computers, the device of forming a research association was actively
8. See KMkagy6 Gijutsukenkya Kumiai Ho, Law No. 81 of 1961.
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used to accomplish the objective. Especially well-known is the research association formed by several enterprises to develop basic technology on super large-scale integrated circuits ("LSI"). This project
was formulated at the suggestion of MITI, and several important enterprises in the field participated. MITI's scientists and engineers participated in the project, and financial incentives were provided by the
government. As a result, an important technology (super LSI) was
created.
However, a research association formed under this law should be
temporary and its objective must be specified-such as research in a
particular area or for a particular product. For this reason, a research
association is suitable when the purpose is to create a basic technology
which would not be created by private initiative alone and which
should be open to any enterprise after a certain period of time.
Another important piece of legislation in this regard is the Basic
Technology Research Facilitation Law 9 enacted in 1985. Under this
law, private enterprises can use government facilities for little rent
when they engage in R&D. This law established the Basic Technology
Research Facilitation Center, which provides funds to private enterprises which are engaged in R&D. The Center itself engages in R&D
activities, arranges joint research projects among private enterprises
and government research institutes, and collects and disseminates
technological information.
C. Competition Policy Implications of Joint R&D
(1) Joint R&D and Restriction of Competition
Tension may arise between joint R&D and competition policy.
Whereas competition policy endeavors to promote competition, joint
R&D may eliminate competition with regard to research. For example, in a large R&D project in which many enterprises participate,
there may be a provision that the member enterprises are prohibited
from doing their own research or that the technology that will be produced shall not be licensed to outside parties. There also may be
other forms of restriction. Such restrictions may outweigh whatever
benefit such a joint R&D may produce.
Joint R&D takes a variety of forms. Research associations are
one type of cooperative relationship in joint R&D. Other forms include arrangements among independent enterprises by which they
9. Kibangijutsu kenkya Enkatsuka Ho, Law No. 65 of 1985. For a comment on this law,
see supra note 8.
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participate in a project, the establishment of a company or joint venture entity for the purpose of doing research, and a consignment by
one enterprise to another for research in which the former provides
financial resources. Whatever form it may take, the arrangement involves a joint operation in one way or another, and the freedom of the
participants may be restricted in some ways.
Therefore, under some circumstances, the competition law should
intervene and remove restrictions which would unduly stifle competition whether in research or in the production of a commodity which
incorporates the results of research. It should be remembered, however, that the AML should intervene into joint R&D activities selectively. The AML should intervene only in those situations in which
anticompetitive impacts of joint activities of R&D clearly surpass benefits that accrue from them.
The competition-law authorities and courts in major nations are
aware that there should be this balance between those two policies.
Each jurisdiction has tried to come up with some means of maintaining a proper balance between those two requirements. In the United
States, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993,10 which mitigates the legal responsibility under
antitrust laws of enterprises engaged in joint R&D activities. Under
this law, a research joint venture or a production joint venture is dealt
with by "the rule of reason." When notified to and approved by the
Antitrust Authorities, it enjoys an exemption from treble-damage liability. Also, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a set of guidelines in 1980 which set out principles that would apply when judging
whether a joint project engaged in by enterprises infringes antitrust
rules.11 In 1995, the Department of Justice published a set of guidelines on licensing of intellectual property rights which have some bearing on joint R&D activities. 12
In the European Union ("EU"), the Commission published a
block exemption which exempts some activities involved in joint R&D
from the application of Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome, which
prohibits an agreement among enterprises which adversely affect competition in commerce between member nations. 13
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994).
11. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES (Nov. 1980).

12. See U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE

&

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES

FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (April 6, 1995).
13. See Commission Regulation 418/85, O.J. L 53/5 (Feb. 22, 1985).
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The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Joint Research

In Japan, the FTCJ issued in 1993 a set of guidelines which set
forth principles to be used when regulating joint R&D under the
AML. 14 In 1989, the FTCJ also announced a set of guidelines on patent and know-how licensing arrangements. 15 The Antimonopoly Act
Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development ("the
Guidelines") were announced on April 20, 1993. The announcement
of the Guidelines was intended to clarify the principles which the
FTCJ utilizes in judging whether a joint R&D activity runs counter to
the prohibition of the AML. The Guidelines reflect the efforts of
FTCJ in attempting to balance the promotion of R&D through joint
activities and the maintenance of competition in R&D and in production which embodies the results of R&D.
The Guidelines divide application of the AML into: (1) joint undertaking of R&D; and (2) arrangements accompanying the implementation of joint R&D.
1. Joint Undertaking of R&D
Joint undertaking of R&D may amount to collusive activity which
unduly restrains competition. The Guidelines state that in judging
whether a joint R&D is compatible with the AML, the FTCJ takes
into consideration such factors as the number of participants in a project, their market shares, and other related matters. If the joint R&D
concerns enterprises which are not in competition, in principle there is
no problem.
If the cumulative share of participants in the production of a
product that will embody research results is twenty percent or less, in
principle there is no problem. A joint R&D project in basic research
is less likely to be questioned than one in applied research, since basic
research is less related to production of the commodity and, therefore,
its impact on competition in a market is likely to be more remote.
Also to be considered are: (1) the need for the joint activity; (2) the
scope of the project in question; and (3) the duration of the project.
However, the Guidelines state that if the cumulative market
share of participants is greater and the result of R&D in question is
indispensable to enterprises in business (for example, the technology
14. A translation of this set of guidelines is published in FTC/Japan Views, Information and
Opinion from the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, No. 15, at 23 (1993).
15. A translation of this set of guildlines is published in FTC/Japan Views, Information and
Opinion from the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, No. 6, at 16 (1989).
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becomes the standard formula in the market), the AML may require
access by outside parties to this technology. This is similar to the "essential facility" doctrine developed in U.S. antitrust laws which require that an enterprise holding an essential facility in a market
without which other enterprises cannot operate must allow outside enterprises to utilize the facility.
2.

Arrangement Accompanying the Implementation of Joint R&D
This section concerns rules that govern the implementation of
joint R&D, such as restrictions imposed on the participants with regard to the freedom of selling products and results of their own independent research. Many such restrictions come under unfair
business practices as defined in Article 1(9) and General Designations
of Unfair Business Practices as published by the FTCJ. The Guidelines classify restrictive provisions included in the implementation of
joint R&D into three categories: (1) provisions which, in principle, do
not fall under unfair business practices ("white clauses"); (2) those
which may fall under unfair business practices ("gray clauses"); and
(3) those which are highly likely to fall under unfair business practices
("black clauses").
The Guidelines establish regulations with regard to these three
areas (we do not need to present details of them here). We will briefly
touch on one aspect of the Guidelines as an example of how these
three categories operate. The Guidelines state, with regard to restrictive provisions concerning the implementation of a joint R&D project,
that the following examples, in principle, do not fall under unfair business practices: (1) an arrangement on the objective, duration, sharing,
and related matters of a R&D project; (2) a request for the obligation
to disclose among the participants information on technologies and
related matters necessary for the joint R&D project; (3) a request for
the obligation to report on the progress of the shared part of the research work to other participants; (4) a restriction on another joint
R&D project with a third party or parties on the same subject matter
as that of the joint R&D project during a reasonable period after the
completion of the joint R&D project, where such restrictions are
deemed necessary for preventing a dispute arising over the fruits of
the joint R&D project; (5) a restriction on the introduction from some
other party of technology which is the object of the joint R&D project; and (6) a restriction on the participation of other firms in the
joint R&D project. As an example of restrictions which may fall
under unfair business practices, the Guidelines cite a restriction im-
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posed on the introduction from some other party of any technology
similar to the technology which is the object of the joint R&D project
beyond the extent necessary for the implementation of the joint R&D
project.
Some restrictions are regarded as highly likely to fall under unfair
business practices. The Guidelines cite as examples the following: (1)
restrictions on R&D in the same subject matter as that of the joint
R&D project after completion of the said joint R&D project; (2) restrictions on the use of existing technologies by a participant or upon
granting of a license of such technologies to a third party; and (3) restrictions on the production and sales activities by any participant with
respect to any competing product or the like other than products
based on fruits of the joint R&D project.
3. Evaluation of the Guidelines
The Guidelines were drafted on the basis of a task force report
commissioned by the FTCJ to study the relationship between joint
R&D activities and competition policy. The FTCJ announced drafts
of guidelines and conducted informal hearings on them in which business persons, lawyers, and academics expressed their views. Taking all
such views into consideration, the FTCJ drafted the final version
which became the Guidelines. This process of drafting shows that the
FTCJ engaged in a careful weighing and balancing of different and
conflicting interests and principles. Therefore, we can safely say that
the Guidelines take a balanced and middle-of-the-road approach.
However, there are a few questions that may be raised with regard to approaches taken by the Guidelines. Let us mention two of
them. As stated earlier, the Guidelines state that if the total market
share of participants in a joint R&D project amounts to twenty percent or less with regard to the product line in which the subject matter
of R&D will have some bearing, there is in principle no problem. This
presumption of validity on the basis of twenty percent market share
may mean, in contrario, that if the market share with regard to the
product produced by participants is more than twenty percent, it may
be regarded more skeptically.
However, in a joint R&D project, if more enterprises pull their
resources together, there may be more research results. If the purpose of a joint R&D project is to maximize results, would the twenty
percent rule be always valid? If there is any possibility of restraining
competition in the product market, is it not sufficient to exercise a
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vigilant watch on collusive activities with regard to the product and
leave the R&D free from antitrust risks?
The Guidelines also state that a clause which is in principle held
valid (a white clause) may raise a problem "if its contents significantly
lack balance among the participants and thereby place any specific
participating firm at an unreasonable disadvantage. ' 16 A question
here is: Is a task of competition laws to balance interests of contracting parties when they negotiate a private agreement? If a private
agreement leads to restraint of competition and affects a market as a
whole, the competition laws should intervene. However, absent such
proof, would such an intervention not lead to an infringement of the
freedom of contract? Also, can the FTCJ judge that the contents of
an agreement "significantly lack balance among participants"? Any
misjudgment on this question may lead to an excessive intervention
into the realm of free activities of enterprises.
The above rules in the Guidelines are quite similar to those contained in a block exemption with regard to joint R&D issued by the
EU authority in 1985 (Regulation 417/85 on Block Exemption of Specialization Agreements, 1985 IL 53/1). In the EU, the rules are similar
to Japanese rules in that they contain a twenty percent threshold rule
and a list of "black clauses," "white clauses," and "gray clauses." Undoubtedly, the FTCJ took the EU rules into consideration when it
drafted the Guidelines.
III.
A.

POLICIES TOWARD DEPRESSED INDUSTRIES

Cyclical Depression and Structural Depression

1. Cyclical Depression
It is generally said that there are two kinds of depression. One is
cyclical depression and the other is structural depression. A cyclical
depression occurs as a process of economic ups and downs. There is a
business cycle in the economy which goes through the stages of economic boom, recession, depression, recovery, and again boom. This is
a natural cycle of the economy, but when a depression comes, enterprises suffer from slackening business activities, a decreasing demand,
and consequently, shrinking business opportunities.
The frequency and length of depression varies from one depression to another, and from country to country. In any market economy, however, a depression as a phase of business cycle occurs
16. See supra note 14, at 43.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:477

inevitably. When a depression comes, appropriate measures which
the government should take are measures of global steering, such as
monetary policy or fiscal policy. The monetary policy is designed to
control the supply of money to the market and, when a depression
comes, the government lowers the discount rate and make it easier for
banks to borrow money from the central bank. Thereby banks have
greater resources to supply money to enterprises. In a fiscal policy,
the government utilizes tax policy to affect the economy, and, when a
depression comes, the government provides tax reduction and exemptions to various industrial sectors, and thereby provides incentives to
enterprises to engage in business activities. Global steering measures,
as above explained, are aimed at controlling the total demand and
supply of money and do not, in principle, interfere with activities of
any one sector of industry or any one enterprise.
Whether the government should extend a protection to a specific
industrial sector or a group of enterprises when a depression comes is
a matter of debate. On the one hand, one may argue that a depression is a good opportunity to weed out inefficient enterprises and,
when they are eliminated, the economy is more efficient. Measures
which belong to social policy, such as unemployment insurance, retraining of workers and adjustment assistance, should be given to unemployed workers of such enterprises.
There is, however, another school of thought which maintains
that when a depression is exceptionally hard, those enterprises which
have a sufficient viability may be eliminated; that it would be an expensive proposition to reconstruct those enterprises again; and that it
would not be contrary to the market principle to give such enterprises
some protection as an "emergency relief."
In Japan, differences of views with regard to what is the proper
role of the government in a cyclical depression have not been entirely
resolved. However, Article 23-3 of the AML provides for a "depression cartel" and this article is premised on the proposition that it is to
the benefit of the national economy to give enterprises a temporary
relief when they are in great difficulty in a cyclical depression.
2.

Structural Depression

A structural depression poses more difficult problems. A structural depression may be defined as a depression which is specific to
one industrial sector and caused by the loss of comparative advantages of the industry vis-a-vis those in foreign countries. An example
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might be the difficulties of depth mining in Japan in comparison with
strip mining in Australia.
Within the category of structurally-depressed industries, there
may be another variation. An example is the aluminum and petrochemical industries of Japan in the 1980s. In those industries, there
were sufficient resources in terms of technology and personnel, and
they were not totally inefficient. However, they were hit hard by the
oil crisis and rising costs of oil, which had enjoyed comparative advantages due to lower costs of oil and natural gas. Therefore, those industries in Japan experienced difficulties.
When enterprises are in the state of structural depression, they
should exit from this sector, wind up business, or shift to another sector. However, there may be exit barriers. For example, if the industry
is characterized as one in which the debt ratio is high, it would create
difficulty for enterprises in the industry to exit since debt must be liquidated and they may find it difficult to shift to other sectors. Also, if
mobility of labor is low, it would create an exit barrier.
There is no completely satisfactory answer to the question of
whether a structurally-depressed industry should be given protection.
The general principle is that a structurally-depressed industry whose
efficiency is lacking should not be given protection in such a way as to
make it possible for it to stay in existence in spite of inefficiency.
However, if a depressed industry is extinguished abruptly, it may
cause social disruptions to the area which depends on that industry,
such as wide-spread unemployment. In this context, one may argue
that a depressed industry should be given a certain time period to
phase itself out gradually. Even if the industry must be phased out, it
should be given a chance for a "soft landing."
Another structurally depressed industry may be revitalized by
some governmental measures. For example, as in the aluminum and
petrochemical industries, they may suffer from excess production capacity and, if given some assistance to reduce excess capacity by governmental measures, their conditions may improve and they may
regain vitality.
It is probably true that governmental measures to deal with structurally depressed industries must vary from industry to industry depending on the nature of the problems. Sometimes the measures
should aim at phasing out the industry in a certain period of time and
at preparing a smooth way out. At other times, the measures should
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aim at providing some conditions to the industry so that it can remove
barriers and difficulties and regain strength.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") coped with this problem and announced that the policy to
deal with a structural depression should be the positive adjustment
program ("the PAP") in which the government provides a temporary
assistance to the industry concerned. A reform program should be
formulated by enterprises concerned, and the assistance should be in
terms of financial aid or otherwise should be given in relation to the
reform program. Such a reform program with governmental assistance should be carried out by a time schedule. The PAP emphasizes
that private initiatives should be utilized as much as possible along
with governmental measures. Therefore, a joint venture of enterprises should be promoted.
B. Depression Cartel
Article 24-3 of the AML is designed to provide temporary relief
to enterprises when a cyclical depression causes serious injury to industries by allowing enterprises in an industry to agree upon a "depression cartel" and cut back production. Under this article, in a
depression, when price goes below the average cost of production,
thereby causing the majority of enterprises in the affected industry to
have difficulty in continuing their operations, and this depression cannot be overcome by rationalization of enterprises, members of the depressed industry may enter into an agreement regarding output
reduction, utilization of capacity, or sales quantity. If the above measures cannot be taken for some reasons or if those measures are proven
to be ineffective, price-fixing is allowed.
When a depression comes and enterprises in an industry wish to
enter into a depression cartel, they must file with the FTCJ a draft
depression cartel agreement. The FTCJ then examines the draft in
light of the requirements in Article 24-3 of the AML and grants a
license to the depression cartel in question for a limited period of
time. A depression cartel duly entered into under Article 24-3 of the
AML is exempted from the application of the AML.
As stated earlier, a depression cartel is allowed only under stringent requirements such as that, in the industry in question, price must
be below the average cost of production and there is no means to
overcome the difficulty. A relief period is specified in the license
given by the FTCJ and it is usually quite short, such as a four-month
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period or a six-month period. From this, one can see that a depression
cartel allowed under Article 24-3 of the AML is designed to deal with
a cyclical depression but not a structural depression. Since there is no
language in Article 24-3 of the AML which says that a depression cartel cannot be used for the purpose of dealing with a structural depression, it could be used if parties chose to do so. However, it would be
an ineffective tool.
In recent years, depression cartel has come under criticism that its
effect tends to "spill over" into other areas. When a depression cartel
is allowed and competing enterprises are given a chance to negotiate
terms of competition among themselves, they acquire a habit of collusion, lose competitive attitudes, and, even after the depression cartel
has been phased out, they tend to engage in collusive activities in
other areas. For this and other reasons, the depression cartel is not
used today. At the time of this writing, the Japanese economy was in
a serious depression which has lasted for six years, and yet no depression cartel has been allowed. It may be that this depression cartel may
be abolished in future.
C. Measures for Structurally Depressed Industry
In Japan, the governmental policy provides some forms of assistance to structurally depressed industries, provided that they possess
sufficient viability to be restored to competitiveness. The Specific Industries Structure Improvement Temporary Measures law, which existed between 1984 and 1988, was typical of such legislation. Although
this law no longer exists, it is a useful model for dealing with structural
depression, and the subsequent legislation is partly modelled after it.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at this law and see how
it operated.
Under this law, MITI was authorized to designate an industry as
a "specific industry" which needed measures under this law. Basically
there were two measures provided for in the law. One was a type of
depression cartel, and the other was a business cooperative arrangement. One cause of economic difficulty in a structural depression is a
surplus of production capacity in relation to effective demand. However, a company operating in the depressed industry tends to be reluctant in unilaterally cutting back production capacity, since to do so
would cause its market share to shrink if others did not cut back their
production as well.
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Under this law, MITI was authorized to issue a directive (administrative guidance) to companies in a specific industry to cut back total
production capacity, and in accordance with this directive, the companies entered into an agreement to limit total capacity in the industry
and to allocate a quota to each company in cutting back production
capacity. This directive was not compulsory but had a de facto impact
over the industry. When companies in this industry agreed to cut back
excess production facility jointly, the government extended a loan
guarantee to the companies so as to make it easier for the companies
to borrow money from banks. This was an authorized cartel arrangement, and an agreement to cut back excess production facility under
this law was exempted from the application of the AML.
The other device for dealing with a structurally-depressed industry is a business cooperative arrangement. To implement this device,
MITI announced a master plan for reorganization of a designated industry, and the companies in the industry then developed a more elaborate program including provisions for measures such as mergers and
acquisitions, the establishment of a joint buying or selling agency, and
technological cooperation. These arrangements had to be approved
by MITI, and even though the approved arrangement did not technically enjoy exemption from the application of the AML, a negotiation
between MITI and the FTCJ preceded the approval and execution of
the program, and this provided assurance that the FTCJ would not
take action against an approved arrangement. The above relief measures were applied in industries such as aluminum, petrochemicals,
steel, and wood pulp, and accomplished some degree of success in alleviating the difficulty in those industries. This law expired in 1988
and was not renewed.
In 1987, a law entitled the Specific Industries Reorientation Law
was enacted. This legislation lasted for nine years (1987-1996). The
difference between the 1984 Act and the 1987 Act is that, whereas in
the former, a sort of depression cartel was incorporated, no cartel device is included in the 1984 Act. It is also to be noted that the primary
emphasis of the 1987 Act was not so much to restore or revive structurally-depressed industries as it was to shift economic resources utilized in those industries and workers employed there to different and
more promising areas.
The issue of how to deal with structurally-depressed industries in
relation to competition laws is a difficult task for the enforcement
agencies of competition laws, not only in Japan but also in other countries. In the United States, a task force organized by the Defense De-
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partment dealt with the issue of defense industries which are faced
with "down-sizing" due to a cut in the defense budget and changes in
17
international circumstances. The report published by the task force
states that the antitrust authorities can examine antitrust questions in
a merger of enterprises in the defense industry purely from the antitrust standpoint. However, it also states that the Defense Department
can express its view on such a merger. The implications are not clear.
However, it may be that a defense necessity may be taken into consideration when assessing an antitrust question in a case in which the
defense industry is involved. In Germany, the Minister of Economics
permitted a merger in the defense industry (the merger of Daimler/
MBB) although the Germany Cartel Authority had decided that it
was contrary to the merger provision in the GWB (the Law against
Restraints of Competition)."'
Governmental measures dealing with structurally-depressed industries do affect international competitiveness of such industries, and
it is hoped that there will be international guidelines (whether formal
or informal) within the framework of the OECD, the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), or other appropriate international bodies.
Now, with the remaining space I just want to discuss two other
issues. One is about the intellectual property aspect. The Financial
Times of October 6, 1995, carried an article by Marco Bronchers, a
Dutch lawyer, about a Japanese case. Let me just briefly discuss this
Japanese case. Now, what is at issue in this case is a Japanese patent
owned by BBS, a German company which produces an aluminum
wheel. There was, at least, a large price differential for the product
between Germany and Japan. So, the company has patents in Germany, Japan, and other countries also. There is another company in
Japan which wanted to import this aluminum wheel from Germany,
which it did. That company was then sued by BBS in Japan. BBS
said that in patent law, each patent is independent in each country,
therefore, even if a patent right was exhausted in Germany, it was not
exhausted in Japan. In the District Court in Tokyo, BBS won, and the
plaintiff took an appeal to the Tokyo High Court, and the Tokyo High
Court reversed the decision. It recognized the international exhaus17. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology, Report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Antitrust Aspects of Defense Industry Consolidation,66
ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 1659 (Special Supp. April 14, 1994).
18. Untersagung eines Zusammenschlusses wegen Entstehens und Verstirkung
marktbeherrschender Stellung, Beschukuss des BKartA won April 1989 (Dimler-MBB), WuW 7
u.8/1989, S.633-670.
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tion doctrine, saying that once the product is sold in Germany, a patent right has been exhausted internationally. Therefore, BBS cannot
assert the patent right in Japan to block the importation of it. The
Court generally gave three rationales for this decision. The first is that
if you allow BBS to block the parallel importation, it means that BBS
sold a product in Germany, and got a profit there already. Then, anybody who wants to import that to Japan must get the license and pay
royalty to BBS. This means that BBS will get the profit twice. A second rationale is that in the trademark area, parallel importation is
generally allowed, and many trademarked goods are patented at the
same time. Therefore, if a patented product could not be imported by
a parallel importation, it means that many trademarked goods cannot
be imported by a parallel importer. So this would undermine this policy of trademark law. The third rationale is that this trademark law's
purpose is to promote distribution, and this is also the objective of
patent law.
This case was decided on March 23, 1995 and is currently being
appealed to the Supreme Court. Since that date, there has been much
argument in Japan about this case. Let me just briefly describe to you
some of the issues there. Generally speaking, some academics are
favorable to this decision, and most practitioners are against it. Now,
the arguments against this decision are something like this. One is
that this will be too disruptive of the production in Japan, and so, if
you recognize international patent-exhaustion doctrine generally, you
will have to allow the importation of the product from anywhere. If it
is from Germany, maybe that is okay, because the economic conditions in Germany are not so different from those in Japan. But, what
about China? What about Malaysia? Malaysia's wage level is something like 1/20th of Japan's. Then, local production would be
impossible.
Another argument is that it will conflict with the compulsory licensing provisions in patent law. In Japanese patent law, there is a
provision which says that if a patent is not used for a long time, one
can apply for a license to use it. Then a patent office can grant you a
license, a nonexclusive license. Suppose this doctrine is recognized,
then nobody is going to produce in Japan anymore. Somebody can
apply for this compulsory license, get it, and then you have to compete
with a product that comes from a country in which the wage level is 1/
20th. It does not make sense. So, this is another argument.
Third, there will be international conflicts because of this decision, especially with the United States, because the United States does
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not like the international exhaustion doctrine, so there may be another section 301 problem. So, this is suspicious to everyone. At this
point, I do not know what is going to happen, because everybody is
waiting for the Supreme Court decision. Before I finish this subject,
let me just make one comment. I think this case should have been
dealt with as one of competition law rather than patent law, because if
you approach the problem by patent law, then you will have to recognize international exhaustion doctrine in general.
Now what about the antitrust aspect of it? If you look at the
factual situation of this case, there must have been a high degree of
product differentiation, because they are competing brands. But this
brand was priced very highly. This means this market was separate
from the other market, so this is the differentiated market. This
means there was a monopoly in this area and the monopoly was
abused. I think this is what was involved in this case. Article XXIII of
the Japanese Antimonopoly Law says that if there is an exercise of a
patent right, then it is exempted from antimonopoly law; however, I
think you can construct a theory that when that right is abused, then
the exemption is not given. I think the Court, the FITCJ, or somebody
should at least look into the situation and try to come up with some
kind of answer to it. Now, I think one of the advantages of dealing
with it as competition law is that you can make selective intervention.
You can intervene only in this situation, without generally saying that
you allow imports from everywhere. Of course, you have to establish
abuse, and you have to overcome this exemption clause and so on,
which may not be easy, but I think it is worth thinking about it. I do
not know what the Supreme Court is going to decide, but I think the
petitioner should stress this point in the Supreme Court. I am not
predicting what the Supreme Court decision is going to be, but I think
this will be a very interesting case.
My last point is the recent U.S./Japanese trade disputes. There
are two of them, one is the U.S./Japan auto dispute, the other one is
the Kodak v. Fuji dispute. Speaking about the auto parts dispute,
what happened was that the U.S. government said that Japanese auto
manufacturers did not purchase enough parts and components from
abroad. It also claimed that Japan did not handle a sufficient number
of foreign cars in its market. The third claim was that the Japanese car
inspection system is too stringent. Now, as far as this third one is concerned, this is the question of technical barriers to trade, so this is a
WTO issue, I think. As far as the first two are concerned, this is essentially an antitrust matter. What happened was that the United
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States said "you do something about it, you set up some type of criteria by which you can measure that imports are increasing, or the increase of car dealers is there, and so on." And the Japanese
government said, "No, we cannot do that, it is contrary to the free
market." So, it was a stalemate between those two governments, and
the United States was going to invoke section 301. Actually, it invoked it, and it was going to impose the 100% retaliatory tariff on the
high value of Japanese cars to the United States. Now, the Japanese
government said, "Well, we will take you to WTO Dispute Settlement." Now, both governments could not really back off because of
the past negotiating process. I think, in this case, private industry was
a kind of savior. Private industry came up with a program which said
that we will attempt to increase purchase of parts and components
from abroad.
The Japanese Car Dealers Association said that they would encourage car dealers to sell more foreign cars in Japan. Now, both governments jumped on it right away, and the Japanese government said
that this is a very good sign, we welcome this, but we have nothing to
do with it. This is a private industry decision. The U.S. government
said this was a very good sign by private industry. The purchase of the
parts and components was likely to increase this much. As far as the
number of car dealers in Japan who handle foreign cars is concerned,
there will be something like 1000 dealers in Japan who handle foreign
cars by the year 2000 or 2005. The Japanese government said "this is a
U.S. figure, we have nothing to do with it." This is our agreementnot to agree. The important thing is that this resolved the problemat least temporarily. So this is the U.S./Japan auto problem.
Regarding Kodak, what Kodak claims to the USTR is that Fuji
Film Company, which has about seventy percent market share in Japan, uses rebates given to the distributors, and there are several distributors in Japan. This rebate is an incentive to stop selling Kodak
products. This is Kodak's claim. Fuji's claim is that Kodak never approached those distributors, so how could they sell the product? The
factual situations claimed by those two parties are so different that at
this point, you cannot say much about it, but I think these are basically
competition-law problems rather than governmental problems.
This raises an issue as to whether or not so-called restricted business practices can be dealt with in the framework of WTO. This is a
very different problem, and I do not have any definite conclusions yet,
but let me comment. We have situations that nullify and impair the
benefits of WTO. For example, export cartels and import cartels are
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generally licensed by the government, but they have some restrictive
effects. If that happens, then you can claim that because of the governmental measure, the WTO benefit has been nullified. Also, there
is the language in the safeguard agreement that the government
should not encourage private enterprises to engage in export restraint.
So, it also may be in violation of WTO.
Another type of problem is the administrative guidance that is
used in Japan. It is not a government measure, but it has de facto
power to create some exclusive situations. In fact, Kodak, I think, argues that MITI did that in the past. Well, suppose MITI does it today.
Would that count still? Well, it probably would-if it is effectively
enforced. In fact, there is the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATIT") panel decision in connection with the semiconductor
agreement between the United States and Japan, in which the panel
said that an administrative exercise by the Japanese government
amounted to such a measure. So that probably will come within the
WTO. Well, what about the situation where there is no administrative
guidance, no licensing, just private conduct? That, I think, is the
hardest case. Generally speaking, it is very hard to get into the WTO
dispute settlement, but there may be discrimination. Suppose in the
Japanese Kodak v. Fuji case-this is all hypothetical-Kodak applied
to the FICJ, under Article 45. Suppose also that Fuji has been doing
exclusive dealing that excluded Kodak products from the Japanese
market. If FTCJ has been prohibiting this in relation to domestic
firms in the past, and if Kodak is denied this relief, I think this will
bring the case close to the WTO.
There may not be a government measure, but I think it is something close to a discriminatory measure, because only foreign companies are denied the antitrust relief. This is all hypothetical, but this, I
think, is one possible type of situation. Let me close with one last
point involving restrictive business practices. Some of the restrictive
business practices have the clear effect of an impediment to market
access-like boycott, which is a clear case, and exclusive dealing,
which is another one; tie-in is probably another type. Export cartels
are a slightly different type, but they may still be contrary to Article
XI of the GATT. But, on the other hand, what about mergers? I
think it is more difficult. When a merger creates a huge company, that
company may be able to engage in predatory pricing, but it may also
raise prices. So, I think it is a little bit more uncertain. What about
the minimum resale prices? What about the cartels to fix the minimum price? Those are regarded as bad in competition law; but, how
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would that be an impediment to market access standing alone? Well,
it probably will not hinder market access as such, so can you find a
connection between this and WTO benefit? That, I think, is quite
doubtful. And so, the badness, in the sense of the antitrust law, does
not necessarily coincide with market-access issues. Some issues do
overlap, but not necessarily. This is something that we have to think
about in the future.

